Judicial Accountability and Judicial Independence: An Empirical Study of Individual Case Supervision
39 Pages Posted: 15 Nov 2008 Last revised: 16 Feb 2009
Date Written: November 13, 2008
Abstract
This article explores the tension between judicial independence and judicial accountability in China, by examining the development, advantages and disadvantages of supervision of "final" court decisions by people's congresses, the procuracy and the courts themselves. Based on a systematic empirical study, the article concludes that while major reforms are required, eliminating individual case supervision (ICS) at this point would deny justice to tens of thousands of people every year. The politics of whether to eliminate or reform ICS - and if so how - illustrate the difficulties of China's legal reform project, why reforms in developing countries all too often fail, and why reforms based on transplants of foreign models frequently fail to take root.
Keywords: law, comparative law, judicial independence, law and development, rule of law
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