Judicial Accountability and Judicial Independence: An Empirical Study of Individual Case Supervision
La Trobe University - Faculty of Law and Management; Oxford University - Centre for Socio-Legal Studies
November 13, 2008
This article explores the tension between judicial independence and judicial accountability in China, by examining the development, advantages and disadvantages of supervision of "final" court decisions by people's congresses, the procuracy and the courts themselves. Based on a systematic empirical study, the article concludes that while major reforms are required, eliminating individual case supervision (ICS) at this point would deny justice to tens of thousands of people every year. The politics of whether to eliminate or reform ICS - and if so how - illustrate the difficulties of China's legal reform project, why reforms in developing countries all too often fail, and why reforms based on transplants of foreign models frequently fail to take root.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 39
Keywords: law, comparative law, judicial independence, law and development, rule of lawworking papers series
Date posted: November 15, 2008 ; Last revised: February 16, 2009
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