Beetles, Frogs, and Lawyers: The Scientific Demarcation Problem in the Gilson Theory of Value Creation
Jeffrey M. Lipshaw
Suffolk University Law School
December 10, 2008
Willamette Law Review, Forthcoming
Suffolk University Law School Research Paper No. 08-38
Recently, Ronald Gilson described a transactional lawyer turned law professor as someone who was a beetle, but became an entomologist. This is not the first non-mammalian metaphor used by an economically inclined legal academic to demarcate those who study and those who are studied. As Richard Posner so colorfully explained rational actors as they appear to economists studying them objectively: "it would not be a solecism to speak of a rational frog." In this short essay, I suggest that both say something about the prevailing view of theorizing that is entitled to privileged epistemic status in the legal academy. Some economic explanations of the activities of beetles, frogs, and lawyers are entitled to this status, and some are not. I assess Professor Gilson's classic 1984 article on value creation by lawyers in terms of its implicit claims to (social) scientific knowledge, and conclude that it is not.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 11
Keywords: transaction cost engineers, rational actor, law and economics, Gilson, philosophy of science, falsification, Popper, demarcation
JEL Classification: B21, K40working papers series
Date posted: November 18, 2008 ; Last revised: August 11, 2009
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