The Caseload Conundrum, Constitutional Restraint and the Manipulation of Jurisdiction
University of Missouri at Kansas City - School of Law
November, 21 2008
Notre Dame Law Review, Vol. 64, 1989
The quantity of litigation in the federal courts has reached unprecedented heights. While this 'crisis of volume' has attracted the attention of legislators and scholars, the judiciary has been left to divine self-help measures to reduce litigants' use of the federal courts. The federal bench that must manage this caseload explosion includes a cadre of recently appointed federal judges. Many of these judges embrace the New Federalism, an initiative to shift governmental power and responsibility back to the states.
This article posits that the combination of judicial overload and injudicious federalism is operating to shunt certain classes of litigants away from federal courts. New procedural and substantive theories are being created to restrict federal jurisdiction. Federal courts are increasingly using the doctrines of preclusion, preemption, abstention and remand to shuttle cases or decision-making authority back to state courts. Complementing this procedural routing of cases is an expansion of summary procedures and a dramatic reduction in the scope of substantive constitutional rights.
This article questions the propriety of the judiciary's use of administrability concerns in the formulation of jurisdictional theories. While court efficiency appears to be a deserving goal, the current method of its implementation is through a reduction of court access to particular classes of litigants. The article analyzes the concept of administrability and posits that administrative efficiency is actually a value-laden argument for selecting which litigants should be permitted access to federal courts.
This article also critically examines whether the adjustment of jurisdictional theories by the judiciary is either an effective docket-clearing mechanism or a desirable institutional practice. Analysis of the assumptions underlying jurisdictional manipulation and the implications of judicial molding of Article III jurisdiction raises serious separation of powers and fairness concerns regarding the quest for administrative efficiency.
Finally, the article offers a new, access-expansive approach to jurisdiction. The proposed ratchet theory of jurisdiction creates a guiding principle of jurisdictional analysis. If the Constitution operates substantively like a one-way wrench - rights may be expanded but not contracted - a jurisdictional analog is imperative. Federal courts should adopt jurisdictional rules that offer the greatest chance of merits determinations.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 46
Keywords: Litigation, Federal courts, Judiciary, Jurisdiction, Federalism, Federal jurisdiction, Restraint, Judicial overload, Docket-clearing, Access, Caseload
JEL Classification: K10, K40, K41, K43
Date posted: November 24, 2008
© 2015 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo7 in 1.157 seconds