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Negotiating under the Monroe Doctrine: Weetman Pearson and the Origins of U.S. Control of Colombian Oil

Marcelo Bucheli
University of Illinois (Urbana-Champaign)



Business History Review, Vol. 82, No. 3, Autumn 2008

Abstract:     
Before World War I, most foreign investment in Latin America came from Britain. By World War II, however, the United States had become the main and unchallenged foreign investor in the region. This analysis of the negotiations that took place between the British firm (Pearson and Son) and the Colombian government over oil contracts reveals the reasons for the shift in influence. The company's lack of awareness that Britain had been overtaken by the United States as the hegemonic power in the hemisphere eventually caused the negotiations to collapse. While talks were proceeding, the company failed to consider how much influence the United States had on Colombian internal politics, and it overlooked the history of U.S.-Colombia relations. As a result, Pearson never received oil concessions in Colombia; instead, they were granted to American companies, consolidating U.S. power in the region.

Keywords: foreign investment, Colombia, oil, Great Britain, negotiations, Monroe Doctrine, U.S. influence

JEL Classifications: F23, L71, F13, N46, N56, N76, N86

Accepted Paper Series

Date posted: November 24, 2008 ; Last revised: September 30, 2009

Suggested Citation

Bucheli, Marcelo, Negotiating under the Monroe Doctrine: Weetman Pearson and the Origins of U.S. Control of Colombian Oil (September 23, 2008). Business History Review, Vol. 82, No. 3, Autumn 2008. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1305967


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Marcelo Bucheli (Contact Author)
University of Illinois (Urbana-Champaign) ( email )
Urbana
Champaign, IL 61820
United States
(217) 244-0208 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.business.uiuc.edu/mbucheli/
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