Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1306801
 
 

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Mere Thieves


Robert Steinbuch


University of Arkansas at Little Rock - William H. Bowen School of Law

November 25, 2008


Abstract:     
Today, criminals are capable of covertly stealing financial secrets from multinational corporations. Securities jurisprudence, however, has focused largely on the activities of insiders who secretly trade on information that they legally garner through their positions of trust, and has not addressed the culpability of "mere thieves" who trade on confidential financial information gained through illegal means. As such, a void in securities law exists regarding how to address the theft and use of confidential financial information by strangers under the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) Rule 10b-5. This article sets forth a jurisprudential analysis under which mere thieves who trade on stolen confidential information are liable for insider trading.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 46

Keywords: Insider Trading

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Date posted: November 25, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Steinbuch, Robert, Mere Thieves (November 25, 2008). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1306801 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1306801

Contact Information

Robert Steinbuch (Contact Author)
University of Arkansas at Little Rock - William H. Bowen School of Law ( email )
1201 McMath Street
Little Rock, AR 72202
United States
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