Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1307746
 
 

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The Effect of Perfect Monitoring of Matched Income on Sales Tax Compliance: An Experimental Investigation


Cathleen A. Johnson


University of Arizona - Department of Economics; Center for Interuniversity Research and Analysis on Organization (CIRANO)

David Masclet


Université de Rennes I; M@rsouin

Claude Montmarquette


Center for Interuniversity Research and Analysis on Organization (CIRANO)

July 1, 2008

CIRANO - Scientific Publications No. 2008s-17

Abstract:     
Noncompliance is a quantitatively important phenomenon that significantly affects revenue sources for governments. This phenomenon raises challenging questions about the determinants of tax reporting and about the appropriate design of a tax system. This paper provides specific empirical insights using an experimental approach to evaluate the effects of systematic sales tax monitoring and the determinants of sales tax compliance. The results indicate that if perfect monitoring is instituted without other complementary policies, an increase in tax revenues is not the likely outcome. Once people have chosen their level of tax compliance, a stepped up policy of increased monitoring aimed at reducing fiscal fraud may not necessarily increase tax revenues. The reference-dependent effect observed in the data suggests that individuals will try to recover their losses following any policy changes even if it means taking more risks.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 42

Keywords: sales tax, perfect monitoring, experimental economics, reference-dependent effect

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Date posted: November 29, 2008 ; Last revised: March 25, 2009

Suggested Citation

Johnson, Cathleen A. and Masclet, David and Montmarquette, Claude, The Effect of Perfect Monitoring of Matched Income on Sales Tax Compliance: An Experimental Investigation (July 1, 2008). CIRANO - Scientific Publications No. 2008s-17. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1307746 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1307746

Contact Information

Cathleen Amanda Johnson
University of Arizona - Department of Economics ( email )
McClelland Hall
Tucson, AZ 85721-0108
United States
Center for Interuniversity Research and Analysis on Organization (CIRANO) ( email )
2020 rue University, 25th Floor
Montreal, Quebec H3C 3J7
Canada
514-985-4000, ext. 3034 (Phone)
David Masclet
Université de Rennes I ( email )
7, Place Hoche
35065 Rennes Cedex
France
M@rsouin (Môle Amoricain de Recherche sur la Société de l'information et les Usages d'Internet) ( email )
France

Claude Montmarquette (Contact Author)
Center for Interuniversity Research and Analysis on Organization (CIRANO) ( email )
2020 rue University, 25th Floor
Montreal, Quebec H3C 3J7
Canada
(514) 985-4015 (Phone)
(514) 985-4039 (Fax)
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