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'Lending by Example': Direct and Indirect Effects of Foreign Banks in Emerging Markets


Mariassunta Giannetti


Stockholm School of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Steven Ongena


Tilburg University - CentER, European Banking Center (EBC); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

September 2008

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP6958

Abstract:     
Using a novel dataset that allows us to trace the primary bank relationships of a sample of mostly unlisted firms, we explore which borrowers are able to benefit from foreign bank presence in emerging markets. Our results suggest that the limits to financial integration are less tight than the static picture of bank-firm relationships implies. Even though foreign banks are more likely to engage large and foreign-owned firms, they do not terminate relationships with the clients of banks they acquire as often as domestic financial acquirers do. Most importantly, firms appear to have the same access to financial loans and ability to invest whether they borrow from a foreign bank or not. Since firms without bank relationships make lower use of financial loans, and invest less, our results suggest that by making relationships more stable and by indirectly enhancing access to the financial system, foreign banks may benefit all firms.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 51

Keywords: competition, emerging markets, foreign bank lending, lending relationships

JEL Classification: G21, L11, L14

working papers series


Date posted: December 2, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Giannetti, Mariassunta and Ongena, Steven R. G., 'Lending by Example': Direct and Indirect Effects of Foreign Banks in Emerging Markets (September 2008). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP6958. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1308029

Contact Information

Mariassunta Giannetti (Contact Author)
Stockholm School of Economics ( email )
P.O. Box 6501
Sveavagen 65
SE-113 83 Stockholm
Sweden
+46 8 736 9607 (Phone)
+46 8 312 327 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www2.hhs.se/personal/giannetti
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
Steven R. G. Ongena
Tilburg University - CentER, European Banking Center (EBC) ( email )
P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
+31 13 466 2417 (Phone)
+31 13 466 2875 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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