Inheritance Law and Investment in Family Firms
Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance
University of Naples Federico II - Department of Economics and Statistics; Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Bocconi University - Department of Economics; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP6977
Entrepreneurs may be constrained by the law to bequeath a minimal stake to non-controlling heirs. The size of this stake can reduce investment in family firms, by reducing the future income they can pledge to external financiers. Using a purpose-built indicator of the permissiveness of inheritance law and data for 10,245 firms from 32 countries over the 1990-2006 interval, we find that stricter inheritance law is associated with lower investment in family firms, while it leaves investment unaffected in non-family firms. Moreover, as predicted by the model, inheritance laws affects investment only in family firms that experience a succession.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 62
Keywords: Family firms, Inheritance law, Investor protection
JEL Classification: G32working papers series
Date posted: December 2, 2008
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