Expanding 'Choice' in School Choice
Duke University - Department of Economics
National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS)
November 28, 2008
Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) Research Paper No. 20
Truthful revelation of preferences has emerged as a desideratum in the design of school choice programs. Gale-Shapley's deferred acceptance mechanism is strategy-proof for students but limits their ability to communicate their preference intensities. This results in ex-ante inefficiency when ties at school preferences are broken randomly. We propose a variant of deferred acceptance mechanism which allows students to influence how they are treated in ties. It maintains truthful revelation of ordinal preferences and supports a greater scope of efficiency.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 54
Keywords: Gale-Shapley's deferred acceptance algorithm, choice-augmented deferred acceptance, tie breaking, ex ante Pareto efficiency
JEL Classification: C72, C78, D61, D78, I20working papers series
Date posted: November 29, 2008 ; Last revised: April 13, 2009
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