Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1308730
 
 

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Expanding 'Choice' in School Choice


Atila Abdulkadiroglu


Duke University - Department of Economics

Yeon-Koo Che


Columbia University

Yosuke Yasuda


National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS)

November 28, 2008

Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) Research Paper No. 20

Abstract:     
Truthful revelation of preferences has emerged as a desideratum in the design of school choice programs. Gale-Shapley's deferred acceptance mechanism is strategy-proof for students but limits their ability to communicate their preference intensities. This results in ex-ante inefficiency when ties at school preferences are broken randomly. We propose a variant of deferred acceptance mechanism which allows students to influence how they are treated in ties. It maintains truthful revelation of ordinal preferences and supports a greater scope of efficiency.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 54

Keywords: Gale-Shapley's deferred acceptance algorithm, choice-augmented deferred acceptance, tie breaking, ex ante Pareto efficiency

JEL Classification: C72, C78, D61, D78, I20

working papers series


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Date posted: November 29, 2008 ; Last revised: April 13, 2009

Suggested Citation

Abdulkadiroglu, Atila and Che, Yeon-Koo and Yasuda, Yosuke, Expanding 'Choice' in School Choice (November 28, 2008). Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) Research Paper No. 20. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1308730 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1308730

Contact Information

Atila Abdulkadiroglu
Duke University - Department of Economics ( email )
Durham, NC 27708-0204
United States
Yeon-Koo Che (Contact Author)
Columbia University ( email )
420 W. 118th Street
New York, NY 10027
Yosuke Yasuda
National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS) ( email )
7-22-1 Roppongi, Minato-ku
Tokyo, Tokyo 106-8677
Japan
HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/yosukeyasuda/Home
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