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Information Acquisition During a Descending Auction


Achim Wambach


University of Cologne; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)
October 2008

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7023

Abstract:     
If bidders can acquire information during the auction the descending auction is no longer equivalent to a first-price-sealed-bid auction. Revenue equivalence does not hold. The incentive to acquire information can even be larger in a descending auction than in an ascending auction.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 28

Keywords: Descending auction, Dutch auction, First price sealed bid auction, Information acquisition

JEL Classification: D44, D82, D83

working papers series


Date posted: December 18, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Wambach, Achim, Information Acquisition During a Descending Auction (October 2008). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7023. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1311147

Contact Information

Achim Wambach (Contact Author)
University of Cologne ( email )
Albertus-Magnus-Platz
Cologne, 50923
Germany
+49 221 470 4433 (Phone)
+49 221 470 5024 (Fax)
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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References:  16

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