Abstract

 
 

References (173)



 


 



Structural Reform and Firm Profitability in Developing Countries


Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra


Northeastern University

Luis Alfonso Dau


University of South Carolina; Northeastern University - Department of International Business and Strategy

July 5, 2008

William Davidson Institute Working Paper No. 940

Abstract:     
We extend agency theory to propose that structural reform positively impacts firm profitability in developing countries because the improvements in external monitoring that accompany structural reform decrease the agency costs faced by firms. However, we also argue that not all firms benefit equally from structural reform because their agency problems are impacted differently. Hence, we propose that structural reform results in higher improvements in profitability for domestic state-owned and domestic private firms than it does for subsidiaries of foreign firms. Results of the analyses of the largest 500 firms in Latin America support the arguments, suggesting that, contrary to the views of many critics of globalization, domestic firms are the main beneficiaries of structural reform in developing countries.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 47

Keywords: agency theory, structural reform, firm profitability, state-owned firms, private firms

JEL Classification: F23, G34, L33, M21

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: December 8, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Cuervo-Cazurra, Alvaro and Dau, Luis Alfonso, Structural Reform and Firm Profitability in Developing Countries (July 5, 2008). William Davidson Institute Working Paper No. 940. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1311928 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1311928

Contact Information

Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra (Contact Author)
Northeastern University ( email )
College of Business Administration
313 Hayden Hall, 360 Huntington Avenue
Boston, 02115
United States
16173736568 (Phone)
16173738628 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://cuervo-cazurra.com

Luis Alfonso Dau
University of South Carolina ( email )
Columbia, SC 29208
United States
Northeastern University - Department of International Business and Strategy ( email )
Boston, MA 02115
United States

Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 635
Downloads: 146
Download Rank: 101,321
References:  173

© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright
This page was processed by apollo3 in 0.485 seconds