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Politicians: Be Killed or Survive

Bruno S. Frey
University of Zurich - Faculty of Business Administration - Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (IEW); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich

Benno Torgler
Queensland University of Technology; CREMA; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

December 2008

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 2483

Abstract:
In the course of history, a large number of politicians have been assassinated. Rational choice hypotheses are developed and tested using panel data covering more than 100 countries over a period of 20 years. Several strategies, in addition to security measures, are shown to significantly reduce the probability of politicians being attacked or killed: extended institutional and governance quality, democracy, voice and accountability, a well functioning system of law and order, decentralization via the division of power and federalism, larger cabinet size and strengthened civil society. There is also support for a contagion effect.

Keywords: assassinations, rational choice, governance, democracy, dictatorship, deterrence, protection

JEL Classifications: D01, D70, K14, K42, Z10

Working Paper Series

Date posted: December 09, 2008 ; Last revised: December 09, 2008

Suggested Citation

Frey, Bruno S. and Torgler, Benno, Politicians: Be Killed or Survive (December 2008). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 2483. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1313020

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Contact Information

Bruno S. Frey (Contact Author) University of Zurich - Faculty of Business Administration - Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (IEW) ( email ) Winterthurerstrasse 30 CH-8006 Zurich Switzerland +41 44 634 37 31 (Phone) +41 44 634 35 99 (Fax)
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research) Poschinger Str. 5 DE-81679 Munich Germany HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de
Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich ( email ) Zürichbergstrasse 18 8092 Zurich CH-1015 Switzerland
Benno Torgler Queensland University of Technology ( email ) GPO Box 2434 2 George Street Brisbane, Queensland 4001 Australia
CREMA Gellertstrasse 18 Basel Zurich CH 8006 Switzerland
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research) Poschinger Str. 5 DE-81679 Munich Germany

Abstract

References (80)

Date posted: December 09, 2008 ; Last revised: December 09, 2008

Suggested Citation

Contact Information

Bruno S. Frey (Contact Author)

Benno Torgler