Interval Game Theoretic Division Rules
'A.l. Cuza' University of Iasi, Romania - Faculty of Computer Sciences
LUISS Guido Carli University
Stef H. Tijs
Tilburg University - Center For Economic Research; Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research; Università degli Studi di Genova - Dipartimento di Matematica
November 7, 2008
CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2008-97
Interval bankruptcy problems arise in situations where an estate has to be liquidated among a fixed number of creditors and uncertainty about the amounts of the estate and the claims is modeled by intervals. We extend in the interval setting the classic results by Curiel, Maschler and Tijs (Bankruptcy games, Zeitschrift fuer Operations Research, 31 (1987), A 143 - A 159) that characterize division rules which are solutions of the cooperative bankruptcy game.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 19
Keywords: cooperative games, interval data, bankruptcy problems
JEL Classification: C71
Date posted: December 10, 2008
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