Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1313613
 
 

Citations (1)



 
 

Footnotes (3)



 


 



Interval Game Theoretic Division Rules


Rodica Branzei


'A.l. Cuza' University of Iasi, Romania - Faculty of Computer Sciences

Marco Dall'Aglio


LUISS Guido Carli University

Stef H. Tijs


Tilburg University - Center For Economic Research; Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research; Università degli Studi di Genova - Dipartimento di Matematica

November 7, 2008

CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2008-97

Abstract:     
Interval bankruptcy problems arise in situations where an estate has to be liquidated among a fixed number of creditors and uncertainty about the amounts of the estate and the claims is modeled by intervals. We extend in the interval setting the classic results by Curiel, Maschler and Tijs (Bankruptcy games, Zeitschrift fuer Operations Research, 31 (1987), A 143 - A 159) that characterize division rules which are solutions of the cooperative bankruptcy game.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 19

Keywords: cooperative games, interval data, bankruptcy problems

JEL Classification: C71

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: December 10, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Branzei, Rodica and Dall'Aglio, Marco and Tijs, Stef H., Interval Game Theoretic Division Rules (November 7, 2008). CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2008-97. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1313613 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1313613

Contact Information

Rodica Branzei (Contact Author)
'A.l. Cuza' University of Iasi, Romania - Faculty of Computer Sciences ( email )
16 Berthelot Street
6600 Iasi
Romania
Marco Dall'Aglio
LUISS Guido Carli University
Via O. Tommasini 1
Rome, Roma 00100
Italy
Stef H. Tijs
Tilburg University - Center For Economic Research ( email )
P.O. Box 90153
B925
5000 LE Tilburg
Netherlands
+31 13 466 2348 (Phone)
Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research ( email )
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
University of Genoa - Dipartimento di Matematica
Via Dodecaneso 35
16146 Genoa
Italy
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 270
Downloads: 29
Citations:  1
Footnotes:  3

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo8 in 0.219 seconds