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Compulsory Licensing: Evidence from the Trading with the Enemy Act
Petra Moser Stanford University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Alessandra Voena Stanford University December 12, 2009 Abstract: Compulsory licensing allows firms in developing countries to produce foreign-owned inventions without the consent of foreign patent owners. This paper uses an exogenous event of compulsory licensing after World War I under the Trading with the Enemy Act to examine the long run effects of compulsory licensing on domestic invention. Difference-in-differences analyses of nearly 200,000 chemical inventions suggest that compulsory licensing increased domestic invention by at least 20 percent.
Keywords: Compulsory licensing, licensing, patent law, innovation, invention, TRIPS JEL Classifications: O3, O34, O12, N00, N42, I10, I18, K33 Working Paper SeriesDate posted: June 25, 2009 ; Last revised: December 18, 2009Suggested CitationContact Information
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