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Compulsory Licensing - Evidence from the Trading with the Enemy Act

Petra Moser
Stanford University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Alessandra Voena
Stanford University


June 23, 2009


Abstract:     
Compulsory licensing, which is permissible under the Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement, allows domestic firms to produce inventions that are patented by foreign nationals, without the consent of patent owners. As an emergency measure, compulsory licensing offers clear benefits, as it helps deliver life-saving drugs to millions of patients. The long run effects of compulsory licensing, however, are unclear. This paper uses an exogenous event of compulsory licensing after World War I to measure the long-run effects of compulsory licensing on domestic invention in the licensing country. Specifically, we compare changes in patents by domestic inventors across U.S. chemical inventions that were differentially affected by compulsory licensing under the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) of World War I. Our data suggest that compulsory licensing has a large positive effect on domestic invention. The data also show that the full effects of compulsory licensing take up to ten years to materialize, suggesting that they will be missed in analyses of contemporary data.

Keywords: Compulsory licensing, licensing, patent law, innovation, invention, TRIPS

JEL Classifications: O3, O34, O12, N00, N42, I10, I18, K33

Working Paper Series

Date posted: June 25, 2009 ; Last revised: June 25, 2009

Suggested Citation

Moser, Petra and Voena, Alessandra, Compulsory Licensing - Evidence from the Trading with the Enemy Act (June 23, 2009). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1313867


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Contact Information

Petra Moser (Contact Author)
Stanford University - Department of Economics ( email )
Landau Economics Building
579 Serra Mall
Stanford, CA 94305-6072
United States
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Alessandra Voena
Stanford University ( email )
Stanford, CA 94305
United States
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