Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1314230
 
 

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Ex Post Regulation Facilitates Collusion


Patrick Beschorner


Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW)

2008

ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 08-099

Abstract:     
Under ex ante access regulation entrants often claim that access fees are excessive. I show that this is only the case if further entry is admitted. If the entrant is protected from further entry it would agree with the incumbent upon a strictly positive access fee which may exceed the efficient level. Ex post regulation facilitates this type of collusion and should be abandoned.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 13

Keywords: entry deterrence, access regulation, network infrastructure, vertical differentiation

JEL Classification: K21, K23, L42, L51

working papers series


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Date posted: December 10, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Beschorner, Patrick, Ex Post Regulation Facilitates Collusion (2008). ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 08-099. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1314230 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1314230

Contact Information

Patrick Beschorner (Contact Author)
Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) ( email )
P.O. Box 10 34 43
L 7,1
D-68034 Mannheim, 68034
Germany
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