Independent Auditors as Fiscal Gatekeepers
Luigi A. Franzoni
University of Bologna - School of Economics, Management, and Statistics
International Review of Law and Economics
This paper analyses the implications of mandatory attestation of tax returns. Attestations are provided by independent auditors competing on price. The paper identifies the conditions under which gatekeeping is socially desirable.
In the most general set-up, in which the detection of erroneous attestations depends on the effort exerted by the Revenue Service, gatekeeping proves to improve social welfare when: 1) the private audit cost is low; 2) the share of liability placed on the auditor is large; 3) the tax placed on liable taxpayers is high; and 4) the incentives for the Revenue Service to carry out investigations are otherwise low.
Note: This is a description of the paper and not the actual abstract.
JEL Classification: H29, M49
Date posted: November 12, 1998
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