Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1315292
 
 

Citations (3)



 
 

Footnotes (116)



 


 



A Proposed Test for Separating Pro-Competitive Conditional Rebates from Anti-Competitive Ones


Damien Geradin


George Mason University School of Law; Tilburg University - Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC); Covington & Burling LLP

December 12, 2008


Abstract:     
While the granting of rebates is a common commercial practice largely used by dominant and non-dominant firms, the assessment of rebates is one of the most complex and unsettled areas of competition law. In the EU, the decisional practice of the European Commission and the case-law of the Community courts have been harshly criticized as unnecessarily strict, following a form-based approach that sits uneasily with modern economic theory. In response, DG COMP published in December 2005 a Discussion Paper that promotes an effects-based approach to the assessment of rebates. This approach was recently confirmed in the Guidance Paper of the Commission on Article 82 EC published by in December 2008. US courts have generally shown greater deference to conditional rebates adopted by dominant firms, but the case-law remains unsettled, notably in the area of bundled rebates. Against this background, this paper proposes an analytical framework, based on a three-step test, designed to separate pro-competitive rebates from anti-competitive ones. A particular emphasis will be placed on the treatment of single product retroactive rebates, which create complex issues.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 44

Keywords: rebates, discounts, antitrust, competition, foreclosure, efficiencies, Article 82, Section 2, bundled rebates

JEL Classification: D4, K21, L 41, L42

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: December 14, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Geradin, Damien, A Proposed Test for Separating Pro-Competitive Conditional Rebates from Anti-Competitive Ones (December 12, 2008). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1315292 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1315292

Contact Information

Damien Geradin (Contact Author)
George Mason University School of Law
3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

George Mason Law School Logo

Tilburg University - Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC) ( email )
Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
HOME PAGE: http://www.tilburguniversity.nl/tilec/
Covington & Burling LLP ( email )
1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20004-2401
United States
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 1,337
Downloads: 442
Download Rank: 35,800
Citations:  3
Footnotes:  116

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo6 in 0.406 seconds