University of Texas at Austin - Department of Information, Risk, and Operations Management
University of Texas at Dallas - Jindal School of Management
Andrew B. Whinston
University of Texas at Austin - Department of Information, Risk and Operations Management
December 12, 2008
Economics Letters, No. 100, pp. 359-362, 2008
We study reputations with imperfect audit and a reputation market. The main result shows the existence of a separating equilibrium in the reputation market, which contrasts with Tadelis [Tadelis, S., 2002, The market for reputations as an incentive mechanism, Journal of Political Economy 110(4), 854-882].
Number of Pages in PDF File: 9
Keywords: Reputation, Audit, Infinitely repeated game
JEL Classification: D40, D86, M20, M42Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: January 23, 2009 ; Last revised: May 12, 2009
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