Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1315336
 
 

Citations (2)



 


 



Audited Reputation


Hong Xu


University of Texas at Austin - Department of Information, Risk, and Operations Management

Jianqing Chen


University of Texas at Dallas - Jindal School of Management

Andrew B. Whinston


University of Texas at Austin - Department of Information, Risk and Operations Management

December 12, 2008

Economics Letters, No. 100, pp. 359-362, 2008

Abstract:     
We study reputations with imperfect audit and a reputation market. The main result shows the existence of a separating equilibrium in the reputation market, which contrasts with Tadelis [Tadelis, S., 2002, The market for reputations as an incentive mechanism, Journal of Political Economy 110(4), 854-882].

Number of Pages in PDF File: 9

Keywords: Reputation, Audit, Infinitely repeated game

JEL Classification: D40, D86, M20, M42

Accepted Paper Series


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Date posted: January 23, 2009 ; Last revised: May 12, 2009

Suggested Citation

Xu, Hong and Chen, Jianqing and Whinston, Andrew B., Audited Reputation (December 12, 2008). Economics Letters, No. 100, pp. 359-362, 2008. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1315336

Contact Information

Hong Xu (Contact Author)
University of Texas at Austin - Department of Information, Risk, and Operations Management ( email )
Austin, TX 78712
United States
Jianqing Chen
University of Texas at Dallas - Jindal School of Management ( email )
2601 North Floyd Road
Richardson, TX 75083
United States
Andrew B. Whinston
University of Texas at Austin - Department of Information, Risk and Operations Management ( email )
CBA 5.202
Austin, TX 78712
United States
512-471-8879 (Phone)
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