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The Story of Paramount Communications v. QVC Network: Everything is Personal

Ehud Kamar
University of Southern California - Gould School of Law; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)



CORPORATE STORIES, J. Mark Ramseyer, ed., Foundation Press, 2009
USC CLEO Research Paper No. C08-23
USC Law Legal Studies Paper No. 08-28

Abstract:     
This chapter tells the story of the famous takeover decision in Paramount Communications v. QVC Network. The battle over Paramount lends support to the view that non-pecuniary motivations can sometimes explain battles for corporate control and management behavior better than pecuniary motivations. The selection process that brings executives to top management positions and their wide discretion to shape company strategy once in office leaves ample room for ambition, pride, envy, or animosity to filter into their decisions. It is hard to prove the existence of these drives, let alone measure them, but they are very real in the minds of market professionals. The three-way fight between Paramount, Viacom, and QVC is a textbook example of these motivations. This is consistent with claims that control is especially valuable to corporate decision-makers in the media sector, presumably because it comes with access to non-pecuniary benefits such as visibility, influence, and glamour.

Accepted Paper Series

Date posted: December 18, 2008 ; Last revised: December 18, 2008

Suggested Citation

Kamar, Ehud, The Story of Paramount Communications v. QVC Network: Everything is Personal (December 17, 2008). CORPORATE STORIES, J. Mark Ramseyer, ed., Foundation Press, 2009; USC CLEO Research Paper No. C08-23; USC Law Legal Studies Paper No. 08-28. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1317378


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Ehud Kamar (Contact Author)
University of Southern California - Gould School of Law ( email )
699 Exposition Boulevard
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States
(213) 740-4791 (Phone)
(213) 740-5502 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://law.usc.edu/contact/contactInfo.cfm?detailID=225
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels Belgium
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