Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1317429
 
 

Citations (1)



 
 

Footnotes (251)



 


 



Managers, Shareholders, and the Corporate Double Tax


Michael Doran


University of Virginia School of Law

October 23, 2008

Virginia Law Review, Vol. 95, 2009

Abstract:     
The United States generally imposes two levels of federal income tax on corporate profits. The first level taxes income to the corporation; the second level taxes dividends to the shareholders. Academics and policymakers have long considered this double tax to be "unusual, unfair, and inefficient." Legislators from both political parties have proposed integration of the corporate and individual income taxes on many occasions, but the proposals consistently fail. Prior academic analyses have struggled to explain the failure of integration. This paper demonstrates how certain managers, shareholders, and collateral interests rationally favor certain integration proposals and oppose other integration proposals, while other managers, shareholders, and collateral interests rationally adopt contrary positions. The substantial heterogeneity of interests among managers, shareholders, and collateral interests generally accounts for the stubborn persistence of the double tax. Close examination of the lobbying positions taken by managers, shareholders, and collateral interests in response to the Bush Administration's dividend-exclusion proposal establishes that the heterogeneity of interests directly shapes the legislative process and affects legislative outcomes. The argument presented here implies that, as a political matter, the corporate double tax is much more entrenched than most prior analyses assume.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 79

Keywords: tax, corporate double tax, integration

JEL Classification: K34

Accepted Paper Series





Download This Paper

Date posted: December 18, 2008 ; Last revised: November 17, 2009

Suggested Citation

Doran, Michael, Managers, Shareholders, and the Corporate Double Tax (October 23, 2008). Virginia Law Review, Vol. 95, 2009. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1317429

Contact Information

Michael Doran (Contact Author)
University of Virginia School of Law ( email )
1400 University Ave
Charlottesville, VA 22903
United States
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 1,551
Downloads: 172
Download Rank: 104,824
Citations:  1
Footnotes:  251
Paper comments
No comments have been made on this paper

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo6 in 0.328 seconds