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The Real Effects of Financial Constraints: Evidence from a Financial Crisis
Murillo Campello University of Illinois at Urbana, Champaign - Department of Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) John R. Graham Duke University - Fuqua School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Campbell R. Harvey Duke University - Fuqua School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) October 2, 2009 Abstract: We survey 1,050 CFOs in the U.S., Europe, and Asia to assess whether their firms are credit constrained during the global credit crisis of 2008. We study whether corporate spending plans differ conditional on this measure of financial constraint. Our evidence indicates that constrained firms planned deeper cuts in tech spending, employment, and capital spending. Constrained firms also burned through more cash, drew more heavily on lines of credit for fear banks would restrict access in the future, and sold more assets to fund their operations. We also find that the inability to borrow externally causes many firms to bypass attractive investment opportunities, with 86% of constrained U.S. CFOs saying their investment in attractive projects was restricted during the credit crisis of 2008. More than half of the respondents say they will cancel or postpone their planned investment. Our results also hold in Europe and Asia, and in many cases are stronger in those economies. Although survey-based analyses have limitations, our evidence adds to the portfolio of approaches and knowledge about the impact of credit constraints on corporate behavior.
Keywords: Financial crisis, financing constraints, investment spending, liquidity management, matching estimators JEL Classifications: G31 Working Paper SeriesDate posted: December 22, 2008 ; Last revised: November 20, 2009Suggested CitationContact Information
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