Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1319248
 
 

Footnotes (85)



 


 



Self-Incrimination in EC Antitrust Enforcement: A Legal and Economic Analysis


Wouter P. J. Wils


King's College London – The Dickson Poon School of Law; European Commission

May 30, 2003

World Competition: Law and Economics Review, Vol. 26, No. 4, 2003

Abstract:     
Competition authorities need to obtain intelligence and evidence of antitrust violations so as to be able to punish the antitrust violators and create deterrence. The best information will usually be in the hands of the antitrust violators themselves. The first part of this article gives an overview of the legal instruments which are available to the European Commission and the competition authorities of the Member States in order to collect intelligence and evidence of violations of Articles 81 or 82 EC from the undertakings that have committed these violations or from their staff. The limitations flowing from the privilege against self-incrimination are discussed in particular. The second part of the article contains an economic analysis of the use of direct force, compulsion and leniency as three methods to obtain intelligence and evidence from antitrust violators, including an economic interpretation of the privilege against self-incrimination. Comparing the strengths and weaknesses of the use of direct force, compulsion and leniency, it appears that a combination of these instruments is required for effective and efficient antitrust enforcement.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 25

Keywords: antitrust, enforcement, self-incrimination, leniency

JEL Classification: K14, K21, K42, L40

Accepted Paper Series





Download This Paper

Date posted: December 22, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Wils, Wouter P. J., Self-Incrimination in EC Antitrust Enforcement: A Legal and Economic Analysis (May 30, 2003). World Competition: Law and Economics Review, Vol. 26, No. 4, 2003. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1319248

Contact Information

Wouter P. J. Wils (Contact Author)
King's College London – The Dickson Poon School of Law
Somerset House East Wing
Strand
London, WC2R 2LS
United Kingdom

European Commission ( email )
Brussels, B-1049
Belgium
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 1,802
Downloads: 652
Download Rank: 21,875
Footnotes:  85

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo4 in 0.282 seconds