Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1319642
 
 

References (20)



 


 



Shelf Space Fees and Inter-Brand Competition


Hao Wang


Peking University - China Center for Economic Research (CCER)

December, 22 2008


Abstract:     
When in-store display influences consumer choices, shelf space allocation can be strategically used by retailers to extract payments from manufacturers. The paper finds that manufacturers with better brand names have higher willingness-to-pay for shelf spaces. Shelf space fees soften inter-brand competition and result in higher sale-weighted average retail price. The fees increase the total industry profit but lower the upstream profit. Both the aggregate consumer surplus and social welfare are negatively affected. This paper suggests that even when the shelf space fees do not drive small manufacturers out of marketplaces, they might still be anticompetitive.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 25

Keywords: Antitrust, In-store display, Shelf space fee, Slotting allowance

JEL Classification: L1, L4, M2, M3

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Date posted: December 24, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Wang, Hao, Shelf Space Fees and Inter-Brand Competition (December, 22 2008). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1319642 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1319642

Contact Information

Hao Wang (Contact Author)
Peking University - China Center for Economic Research (CCER) ( email )
Beijing, Beijing 100871
China
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References:  20

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