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How Democracy Resolves Conflict in Difficult GamesSteven J. BramsNew York University (NYU) - Wilf Family Department of Politics D. Marc KilgourWilfrid Laurier University December 23, 2008 GAMES, GROUPS, AND THE GLOBAL GOOD, Simon Levin, ed., Springer, Forthcoming Abstract: Democracy resolves conflicts in difficult games like Prisoners' Dilemma and Chicken by stabilizing their cooperative outcomes. It does so by transforming these games into games in which voters are presented with a choice between a cooperative outcome and a Pareto-inferior noncooperative outcome. In the transformed game, it is always rational for voters to vote for the cooperative outcome, because cooperation is a weakly dominant strategy independent of the decision rule and the number of voters who choose it. Such games are illustrated by 2-person and n-person public-goods games, in which it is optimal to be a free rider, and a biblical story from the book of Exodus.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 21 Keywords: Democracy, voting, game theory, public goods, cooperation, Bible JEL Classification: C72, D02, D62, H41 Accepted Paper SeriesDate posted: December 24, 2008Suggested CitationContact Information
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