How Democracy Resolves Conflict in Difficult Games
Steven J. Brams
New York University (NYU) - Wilf Family Department of Politics
D. Marc Kilgour
Wilfrid Laurier University
December 23, 2008
GAMES, GROUPS, AND THE GLOBAL GOOD, Simon Levin, ed., Springer, Forthcoming
Democracy resolves conflicts in difficult games like Prisoners' Dilemma and Chicken by stabilizing their cooperative outcomes. It does so by transforming these games into games in which voters are presented with a choice between a cooperative outcome and a Pareto-inferior noncooperative outcome. In the transformed game, it is always rational for voters to vote for the cooperative outcome, because cooperation is a weakly dominant strategy independent of the decision rule and the number of voters who choose it. Such games are illustrated by 2-person and n-person public-goods games, in which it is optimal to be a free rider, and a biblical story from the book of Exodus.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 21
Keywords: Democracy, voting, game theory, public goods, cooperation, Bible
JEL Classification: C72, D02, D62, H41Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: December 24, 2008
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