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http://ssrn.com/abstract=1320800
 
 

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Delegated Asset Management, Investment Mandates, and Capital Immobility


Zhiguo He


University of Chicago - Booth School of Business, and NBER

Wei Xiong


Princeton University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

December 2008

NBER Working Paper No. w14574

Abstract:     
This paper develops a model to explain the widely used investment mandates in the institutional asset management industry based on two insights: First, giving a manager more investment flexibility weakens the link between fund performance and his effort in the designated market, and thus increases agency cost. Second, the presence of outside assets with negatively skewed returns can further increase the agency cost if the manager is incentivized to pursue outside opportunities. These effects motivate narrow mandates and tight tracking error constraints to most fund managers except those with exceptional talents. Our model sheds light on capital immobility and market segmentation that are widely observed in financial markets, and highlights important effects of negatively skewed risk on institutional incentive structures.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 45

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Date posted: December 29, 2008  

Suggested Citation

He, Zhiguo and Xiong, Wei, Delegated Asset Management, Investment Mandates, and Capital Immobility (December 2008). NBER Working Paper No. w14574. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1320800

Contact Information

Zhiguo He
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business, and NBER ( email )
5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
HOME PAGE: http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/zhiguo.he/pubs.html

Chicago Booth School of Business Logo

Wei Xiong (Contact Author)
Princeton University - Department of Economics ( email )
Princeton, NJ 08544-1021
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
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