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Part 2.6: Responsibility for Self

Diana Tietjens Meyers
Loyola University of Chicago - Department of Philosophy

1989

Abstract:
Part II. Section 6. Responsibility for Self:

Meyers criticizes Derek Parfit's arguments against the rationality of temporal neutrality -- in other words, the principle of responsibility to self. She urges that autonomy requires providing for one's future.

Working Paper Series

Date posted: December 31, 2008 ; Last revised: December 31, 2008

Suggested Citation

Tietjens Meyers, Diana, Part 2.6: Responsibility for Self (1989). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1321790

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Contact Information

Diana Tietjens Meyers (Contact Author)

Loyola University of Chicago - Department of Philosophy ( email )

Chicago, IL 60611
United States