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http://ssrn.com/abstract=1322526
 
 

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The InBev and Anheuser-Busch Merger in China: A View from Economists


Xinzhu Zhang


Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) - Research Center for Regulation and Competition

Vanessa Yanhua Zhang


Global Economics Group, LLC; Renmin University of China

Howard H. Chang


Global Economics Group, LLC

December 11, 2008

Global Competition Policy Magazine, December 2008

Abstract:     
On November 18, 2008, China's Ministry of Commerce ("MOFCOM"), the Chinese merger control authority, approved InBev's takeover of Anheuser-Busch, with certain restrictions. The InBev Decision is the only published decision that MOFCOM has made to date following the implementation of China's Anti-Monopoly Law ("AML") in August 2008. As such, it has attracted the interest of international antitrust scholars and practitioners.

In this paper, we provide some background on the merger approval process in China and the InBev acquisition, and then discuss the implications of MOFCOM's decision and its other statements on merger policy for the future of merger control in China.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 9

Keywords: Merger and Acquisition, Competition Policy, China

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Date posted: January 6, 2009 ; Last revised: January 8, 2009

Suggested Citation

Zhang, Xinzhu and Zhang, Vanessa Yanhua and Chang, Howard H., The InBev and Anheuser-Busch Merger in China: A View from Economists (December 11, 2008). Global Competition Policy Magazine, December 2008. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1322526

Contact Information

Xinzhu Zhang
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) - Research Center for Regulation and Competition ( email )
Beijing, 100732
China
Vanessa Yanhua Zhang (Contact Author)
Global Economics Group, LLC ( email )
1400 S. Dearborn, Suite 400
Chicago, IL 60603
United States
Renmin University of China ( email )
Room B906
Xianjin Building
Beijing, Beijing 100872
China
Howard H. Chang
Global Economics Group, LLC ( email )
1400 S. Dearborn, Suite 400
Chicago, IL 60603
United States
312-533-4602 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.globaleconomicsgroup.com
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