The InBev and Anheuser-Busch Merger in China: A View from Economists

Global Competition Policy Magazine, December 2008

9 Pages Posted: 6 Jan 2009 Last revised: 8 Jan 2009

See all articles by Xinzhu Zhang

Xinzhu Zhang

Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) - Research Center for Regulation and Competition

Vanessa Yanhua Zhang

Compass Lexecon; Renmin University of China

Howard H. Chang

Global Economics Group, LLC

Date Written: December 11, 2008

Abstract

On November 18, 2008, China's Ministry of Commerce ("MOFCOM"), the Chinese merger control authority, approved InBev's takeover of Anheuser-Busch, with certain restrictions. The InBev Decision is the only published decision that MOFCOM has made to date following the implementation of China's Anti-Monopoly Law ("AML") in August 2008. As such, it has attracted the interest of international antitrust scholars and practitioners.

In this paper, we provide some background on the merger approval process in China and the InBev acquisition, and then discuss the implications of MOFCOM's decision and its other statements on merger policy for the future of merger control in China.

Keywords: Merger and Acquisition, Competition Policy, China

Suggested Citation

Zhang, Xinzhu and Zhang, Vanessa Yanhua and Chang, Howard H., The InBev and Anheuser-Busch Merger in China: A View from Economists (December 11, 2008). Global Competition Policy Magazine, December 2008, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1322526

Xinzhu Zhang

Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) - Research Center for Regulation and Competition ( email )

Beijing, 100732
China

Vanessa Yanhua Zhang (Contact Author)

Compass Lexecon ( email )

United States

Renmin University of China ( email )

Room B906
Xianjin Building
Beijing, Beijing 100872
China

Howard H. Chang

Global Economics Group, LLC ( email )

140 S. Dearborn, Suite 1000
Chicago, IL 60603
United States
312-533-4602 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.globaleconomicsgroup.com

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