Conflicts and Financial Collapse: The Problem of Secondary-Management Agency Costs

Schwarcz, Steven

Abstract

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Conflicts and Financial Collapse: The Problem of Secondary-Management Agency Costs

Steven L. Schwarcz

Duke University - School of Law

October 1, 2009

Yale Journal on Regulation, Vol. 26, No. 2, p. 459, 2009
Duke Law School Public Law & Legal Theory Paper No. 230

Abstract:
Corporate governance scholarship has long focused on conflicts of interest between firms and their top executive officers. This essay contends that increasing leverage and financial complexity make it important for scholars to also focus on conflicts of interest between firms and their secondary managers.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 14

Keywords: conflicts of interest, financial leverage, corporate governance

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Date posted: January 4, 2009 ; Last revised: May 21, 2013

Suggested Citation

Schwarcz, Steven L., Conflicts and Financial Collapse: The Problem of Secondary-Management Agency Costs (October 1, 2009). Yale Journal on Regulation, Vol. 26, No. 2, p. 459, 2009; Duke Law School Public Law & Legal Theory Paper No. 230. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1322536

Contact Information

Steven L. Schwarcz (Contact Author)

Duke University - School of Law ( email )

Box 90360
Duke School of Law
Durham, NC 27708
United States
919-613-7060 (Phone)
919-613-7231 (Fax)