Conflicts and Financial Collapse: The Problem of Secondary-Management Agency Costs
Steven L. Schwarcz
Duke University - School of Law
October 1, 2009
Yale Journal on Regulation, Vol. 26, No. 2, p. 459, 2009
Duke Law School Public Law & Legal Theory Paper No. 230
Corporate governance scholarship has long focused on conflicts of interest between firms and their top executive officers. This essay contends that increasing leverage and financial complexity make it important for scholars to also focus on conflicts of interest between firms and their secondary managers.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 14
Keywords: conflicts of interest, financial leverage, corporate governanceAccepted Paper Series
Date posted: January 4, 2009 ; Last revised: May 21, 2013
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