  |
|
|
||||
|
||||
Conflicts and Financial Collapse: The Problem of Secondary-Management Agency Costs
Steven L. Schwarcz Duke University - School of Law Yale Journal on Regulation, Vol. 26, No. 2, p. 459, 2009 Duke Law School Public Law & Legal Theory Paper No. 230 Abstract: Corporate governance scholarship has long focused on conflicts of interest between firms and their top executive officers. This essay contends that increasing leverage and financial complexity make it important for scholars to also focus on conflicts of interest between firms and their secondary managers.
Keywords: conflicts of interest, financial leverage, corporate governance Accepted Paper SeriesDate posted: January 04, 2009 ; Last revised: November 15, 2009Suggested CitationContact Information
|
|
||||||||||||
© 2009 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Terms of Use Privacy Policy
This page was served by apollo2 in 0.141 seconds.
Download
Facebook
Twitter
Digg
Del.icio.us
CiteULike
