Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1324143
 
 

References (47)



 
 

Citations (1)



 


 



Preventing and Detecting Accounting Irregularities: The Role of Corporate Governance


Nadia Smaili


University of Quebec in Montreal Business School

Réal Labelle


HEC Montréal - Stephen A. Jarislowsky Chair in Governance

January 7, 2009


Abstract:     
This study examines the extent to which corporate governance acts as an efficient means of protecting investors against accounting irregularities, thus contributing to the literatures on governance, on fraudulent financial statements and on the public enforcement of securities laws by market authorities. It does so by empirically testing the prediction that the seriousness or level of non compliance of irregularities detected by market authorities is negatively associated with the quality of governance. For that purpose, a sample of 107 firms identified as reporting issuers in default by the Canadian Securities Administrators and the Ontario Securities Commission is matched with 107 other control firms based on industry, size, stock exchange membership and date of default.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 44

Keywords: Governance, accounting irregularity, financial fraud, restatement, regulation, issuer in default

JEL Classification: G38, G34, G32

working papers series





Download This Paper

Date posted: January 8, 2009  

Suggested Citation

Smaili, Nadia and Labelle, Réal, Preventing and Detecting Accounting Irregularities: The Role of Corporate Governance (January 7, 2009). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1324143 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1324143

Contact Information

Nadia Smaili (Contact Author)
University of Quebec in Montreal Business School ( email )
PB 8888 Station DownTown
Succursale Centre Ville
Montreal, Quebec H3C3P8
Canada
Réal Labelle
HEC Montréal - Stephen A. Jarislowsky Chair in Governance ( email )
3000, Chemin de la Côte-Sainte-Catherine
Montreal, Quebec H3T 2A7
Canada
514 340 6374 (Phone)
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 2,129
Downloads: 679
Download Rank: 20,787
References:  47
Citations:  1
Paper comments
No comments have been made on this paper

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo7 in 0.250 seconds