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Design of a Carbon Tax


Gilbert E. Metcalf


Tufts University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

David A. Weisbach


University of Chicago - Law School; Center for Robust Decisionmaking on Climate & Energy Policy (RDCEP)

January 8, 2009

U of Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 447
U of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 254

Abstract:     
We consider the design of a tax on greenhouse gas emissions for a developed country such as the United States. We consider three sets of issues: the optimal tax base, issues relating to the rate (including the use of the revenues and rate changes over time) and trade. We show that a well-designed carbon tax can capture about 80% of U.S. emissions by taxing fewer than 3,000 taxpayers and up to almost 90% with a modest additional cost. We recommend full or partial delegation of rate setting authority to an agency to ensure that rates reflect new information about the costs of carbon emissions and of abatement. Adjustments should be made to the income tax to ensure that a carbon tax is revenue neutral and distributionally neutral. Finally, we propose an origin-based system for trade with countries that have an adequate carbon tax and a system of border taxes for imports from countries without a carbon tax. We suggest a system that imposes presumptive border tax adjustments with the ability of an individual firm to prove that a different rate should apply. The presumptive tax could be based either on average emissions for production of the item by the exporting country or by the importing country.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 67

JEL Classification: H23, Q54, Q58

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Date posted: January 9, 2009  

Suggested Citation

Metcalf, Gilbert E. and Weisbach, David A., Design of a Carbon Tax (January 8, 2009). U of Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 447; U of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 254. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1324854 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1324854

Contact Information

Gilbert E. Metcalf
Tufts University - Department of Economics ( email )
Medford, MA 02155
United States
617-627-3685 (Phone)
617-627-3917 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
David Weisbach (Contact Author)
University of Chicago - Law School ( email )
1111 E. 60th St.
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-3342 (Phone)
773-702-0730 (Fax)
Center for Robust Decisionmaking on Climate & Energy Policy (RDCEP) ( email )
5735 S. Ellis Street
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

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