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Testing Asymmetric-Information Asset Pricing Models

Bryan T. Kelly
New York University - Leonard N. Stern School of Business

Alexander Ljungqvist
New York University - Department of Finance; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)


August 10, 2009


Abstract:     
Theoretical asset pricing models routinely assume that investors have heterogeneous information. We provide direct evidence of the importance of information asymmetry for asset prices and investor demands using plausibly exogenous variation in the supply of information caused by the closure of 43 brokerage firms' research operations in the U.S. Consistent with predictions derived from a Grossman and Stiglitz-type model, share prices and uninformed investors' demands fall as information asymmetry increases. Cross-sectional tests support the comparative statics: Prices and uninformed demand experience larger declines, the more investors are uninformed, the larger and more variable is stock turnover, the more uncertain is the asset's payoff, and the noisier is the better-informed investors' signal. We show that at least part of the fall in prices is due to expected returns becoming more sensitive to liquidity risk. Our results imply that information asymmetry has a substantial effect on asset prices and that a primary channel linking asymmetry to prices is liquidity.

Keywords: Asymmetric-information asset pricing, liquidity, analyst coverage

JEL Classifications: G12, G14, G17, G24

Working Paper Series

Date posted: January 09, 2009 ; Last revised: August 12, 2009

Suggested Citation

Kelly, Bryan T. and Ljungqvist, Alexander, Testing Asymmetric-Information Asset Pricing Models (August 10, 2009). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1324873


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Alexander Ljungqvist (Contact Author)
New York University - Department of Finance ( email )
Stern School of Business
44 West 4th Street, Suite 9-160
New York, NY 10012-1126
United States
212-998-0304 (Phone)
212-995-4220 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~aljungqv
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
90-98 Goswell Road
London EC1V 7RR United Kingdom
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels Belgium
Bryan T. Kelly
New York University - Leonard N. Stern School of Business ( email )
44 West 4th Street
New York, NY 10012
United States
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