Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1325524
 
 

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A Simple Status Quo that Ensures Participation (with Application to Efficient Bargaining)


Ilya R. Segal


Stanford University

Michael D. Whinston


Northwestern University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

March 16, 2010


Abstract:     
We consider Bayesian incentive-compatible mechanisms with independent types and either private values or interdependent values that satisfy a form of "congruence." We show that in these settings, interim participation constraints are satisfied when the status quo is the randomized allocation that has the same distribution as the equilibrium allocation in the mechanism. Moreover, when utilities are convex in the allocation, we can instead satisfy participation constraints with the deterministic status quo equal to the expected equilibrium allocation in the mechanism. For quasilinear settings, these observations imply the possibility of efficient bargaining when the status quo has the expected efficient decision provided that the total surplus is convex in the decision.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 21

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Date posted: January 12, 2009 ; Last revised: March 25, 2010

Suggested Citation

Segal, Ilya R. and Whinston, Michael D., A Simple Status Quo that Ensures Participation (with Application to Efficient Bargaining) (March 16, 2010). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1325524 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1325524

Contact Information

Ilya Segal (Contact Author)
Stanford University ( email )
Stanford, CA 94305
United States
650-724-4905 (Phone)
650-725-5702 (Fax)
Michael D. Whinston
Northwestern University - Department of Economics ( email )
2003 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States
312-491-8260 (Phone)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
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