Missing in Activism: Retail Investor Absence in Corporate Elections
University of Memphis - Cecil C. Humphreys School of Law
January 13, 2009
Columbia Business Law Review, No. 1, 2010
University of Memphis Legal Studies Research Paper No. 45
Shareholder-led campaigns to install new leadership at U.S. firms — so-called proxy contests — occur too rarely and, when they do occur, are led by the same, boring cast of characters too often. This Article presents empirical evidence from a hand-collected database of public filings of proxy statements from 2006, 2007, and 2008, the years public filings are available from the SEC electronic filing system. In short, the data suggest that the system of contested corporate elections is broken and, from there, the Article points the way toward legal reform. When it comes to the interests of retail investors — i.e., individuals with small stakes in a particular firm — the evidence suggests that contested corporate elections are virtually off-limits as conduit for activism. Retail investors almost never launch a campaign and their interests are not represented well by those who do.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 102
Keywords: proxy contests, corporate elections, proxy solicitations, retail investors
JEL Classification: K20, K22
Date posted: January 14, 2009 ; Last revised: July 2, 2010
© 2015 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo3 in 0.266 seconds