Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1328997
 
 

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Invisible Markets Netting Visible Results: When Sub-Prime Lending Becomes Predatory


Cassandra Havard


University of Baltimore - School of Law


Oklahoma City University Law Review, Vol. 26, 2001

Abstract:     
In this article, I argue that Ellison's metaphor of social invisibility - the societal undervaluing of minorities - is analogous to economic invisibility - the denial of fair access to credit to minorities. I then use the metaphor of invisibility as a basis for understanding the contemporary legal problem of predatory lending, or making credit available to borrowers at unreasonably high interest rates. Disguised as credit access to high-risk, underserved borrowers, predatory lending helps to create risk by offering borrowers products that do not adequately measure risk and that are not fairly priced.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 26

Keywords: minorities, social invisibility, credit, fair access, predatory lending, high interest rates, risk, fair pricing

JEL Classification: K19, K29, K39

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Date posted: January 18, 2009  

Suggested Citation

Havard, Cassandra, Invisible Markets Netting Visible Results: When Sub-Prime Lending Becomes Predatory. Oklahoma City University Law Review, Vol. 26, 2001. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1328997

Contact Information

Cassandra Havard (Contact Author)
University of Baltimore - School of Law ( email )
1420 N. Charles Street
Baltimore, MD 21218
United States
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