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Statement by European Academics on the Inappropriateness of Imposing Increased Internet Regulation in the EU


Martin E. Cave


University of Warwick - Warwick Business School; Brunel University

Nico Van Eijk


Institute for Information Law (IViR, University of Amsterdam)

Luigi Prosperetti


Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca

Richard Collins


The Open University

Alexandre De Streel


University of Namur

Pierre Larouche


Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC); College of Europe - Bruges; Tilburg University - Tilburg Law School; Center on Regulation in Europe (CERRE)

Tommaso M. Valletti


Imperial College Business School; University of Rome II - Department of Financial and Quantitative Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

January 8, 2009


Abstract:     
The European institutions are currently debating the desirability of imposing restrictions on the way in which internet service providers (ISPs) in the EU can manage their networks and develop their offerings, under the broad heading of 'network neutrality'.

In our opinion, so far, the need for new legislation on network neutrality in Europe is unproven, and the unintended consequences on restricting variety, competition and innovation are too big for comfort. We believe that some of the amendments put forward by the EP and Council are premature and will prove detrimental to long term end user interests in the EU, and urge that they be not adopted. The only reasonable course for the time being is to strengthen transparency towards end-users and for the rest rely on existing legislation.

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Date posted: January 19, 2009  

Suggested Citation

Cave, Martin E., Van Eijk, Nico, Prosperetti, Luigi, Collins, Richard, De Streel, Alexandre, Larouche, Pierre and Valletti, Tommaso M., Statement by European Academics on the Inappropriateness of Imposing Increased Internet Regulation in the EU (January 8, 2009). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1329926 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1329926

Contact Information

Martin E. Cave
University of Warwick - Warwick Business School ( email )
Centre for Management under Regulation (CMuR)
Coventry CV4 7AL
United Kingdom
Brunel University
Uxbridge
Uxbridge, Middlesex, Middlesex UB8 3PH
United Kingdom
Nico Van Eijk
Institute for Information Law (IViR, University of Amsterdam) ( email )
Kloveniersburgwal 48
Amsterdam, 1012 CX
Netherlands
HOME PAGE: http://www.ivir.nl/staff/vaneijk.html
Luigi Prosperetti
Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca ( email )
Piazza dell'Ateneo Nuovo 1
Milano
Italy
+39/02/6448-6591 (Phone)
Richard Collins
The Open University ( email )
Walton Hall
Milton Keynes MK6 7AA
United Kingdom
00441908652231 (Phone)
Alexandre De Streel
University of Namur ( email )
8 rempart de la vierge
Namur, 5000
Belgium
Pierre Larouche (Contact Author)
Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC) ( email ) ( email )
Warandelaan 2
Montesquieu Building, Room M 535
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
+31.13.466.8270 (Phone)
College of Europe - Bruges ( email )
Dijver 11
B-8000 Brugge
Belgium
Tilburg University - Tilburg Law School ( email ) ( email )
Warandelaan 2
Montesquieu Building, Room M 535
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
+31.13.466.8270 (Phone)
Center on Regulation in Europe (CERRE) ( email )
Rue de l'Industrie 42
Brussels, 1040
Belgium
Tommaso M. Valletti
Imperial College Business School ( email )
South Kensington Campus
Exhibition Road
London SW7 2AZ, DC SW7 2AZ
United Kingdom
University of Rome II - Department of Financial and Quantitative Economics ( email )
Via Columbia n.2
Roma, 00133
Italy
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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