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Mothers' Quest for Job Protection: Building the Nest or Breaking the Glass Ceiling? Evidence Using Spanish Longitudinal Data


Daniel Fernández-Kranz


IE Business School

Aitor Lacuesta


Bank of Spain

January 20, 2009


Abstract:     
Previous research has found that temporary contracts delay marriage and fertility in Spain. Using newly released administrative data we study the motivations behind the fertility delay that is associated with job protection. We find that during the five years after the birth of the first child mothers in protected jobs promote less and their wages grow less (16 per cent) compared to mothers that had a fixed-term contract at the time of childbirth. The poor after-birth outcomes of mothers in protected jobs contrasts with their better performance before birth, with wages growing more rapidly than those of other women and other mothers. We provide evidence that a permanent contract acts as insurance against the negative wage effects of motherhood, but at the price of less wage growth. We also find that mothers that had a permanent contract at childbirth reduce their working time more, forgo opportunities of promotion outside the firm and have a lower return to each additional year of experience compared to mothers with a temporary contract. Our interpretation of these results is that job protection helps mothers conciliate work and family responsibilities rather than to achieve professional success.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 46

Keywords: Family gap, motherhood, wages, job protection

JEL Classification: J13, J16, J31

working papers series


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Date posted: January 21, 2009  

Suggested Citation

Fernández-Kranz, Daniel and Lacuesta, Aitor, Mothers' Quest for Job Protection: Building the Nest or Breaking the Glass Ceiling? Evidence Using Spanish Longitudinal Data (January 20, 2009). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1330386 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1330386

Contact Information

Daniel Fernández-Kranz (Contact Author)
IE Business School ( email )
c/ Mª de Molina, 11
Madrid, 28006
Spain
(0034) 915689600 (Phone)
Aitor Lacuesta
Bank of Spain ( email )
Madrid 28014
Spain
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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