Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1330434
 
 

Citations (1)



 
 

Footnotes (70)



 


 



The Corporate Income Tax and the Competitiveness of U.S. Industries


Michael S. Knoll


University of Pennsylvania Law School; University of Pennsylvania - Real Estate Department

January 15, 2009

U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 09-01

Abstract:     
Hit hard by the financial crisis and recession, U.S. auto producers are seeking a massive bailout from the U.S. Congress. Many reasons are given for the U.S. auto industry's lack of competitiveness including the U.S. corporate income tax. Although it is regularly asserted that there is a direct connection between the corporate income tax and competitiveness, what that connection is has not been carefully spelled out. In this essay, I describe how the corporate income tax directly harms the competitiveness of U.S. industries. I show that the mechanism differs depending upon whether the U.S. industry is defined as the global production of U.S.-based corporations or as all productive activities undertaken in the United States regardless of where the corporations undertaking those activities are based. I also examine the impact on competitiveness of various possible replacements for the corporate income tax, including a value added tax (VAT), formulary apportionment, a cost of capital allowance (COCA), and preset "in lieu of tax" payments.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 30

Keywords: foreign direct investment, international taxation, tax competition, capital export neutrality (CEN), capital import neutrality (CIN), capital ownership neutrality (CON), automobiles, bailout, credit crunch, value added tax, formulary apportionment, and cost of capital allowance (COCA)

JEL Classification: K34, L6

working papers series





Download This Paper

Date posted: January 21, 2009  

Suggested Citation

Knoll, Michael S., The Corporate Income Tax and the Competitiveness of U.S. Industries (January 15, 2009). U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 09-01. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1330434 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1330434

Contact Information

Michael S. Knoll (Contact Author)
University of Pennsylvania Law School ( email )
3501 Sansom Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
215-898-6190 (Phone)
215-573-2025 (Fax)
University of Pennsylvania - Real Estate Department ( email )
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6330
United States
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 1,766
Downloads: 420
Download Rank: 39,106
Citations:  1
Footnotes:  70
Paper comments
No comments have been made on this paper

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo2 in 0.391 seconds