|
||||
|
||||
Brief of Amici Curiae Economists in Support of Petitioners, Bell Atlantic V. TwomblyWilliam J. BaumolNew York University - Stern School of Business, Berkley Center for Entrepreneurial Studies; Leonard N. Stern School of Business - Department of Economics Michael J. BoskinStanford University - The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Robert W. CrandallBrookings Institution; AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies Kenneth G. ElzingaUniversity of Virginia - Department of Economics David S. EvansUniversity of Chicago Law School; University College London; Global Economics Group Gerald R. FaulhaberUniversity of Pennsylvania - Wharton School Franklin M. FisherMassachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics Luke FroebVanderbilt University - Strategy and Business Economics Richard GilbertUniversity of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics Paul L. JoskowAlfred P. Sloan Foundation; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics Michael L. KatzUniversity of California, Berkeley - Economic Analysis & Policy Group Paul R. MilgromStanford University Thomas G. Mooreaffiliation not provided to SSRN Janusz A. OrdoverNew York University (NYU) - Department of Economics Robert H. PorterNorthwestern University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Frederic M. SchererHarvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS) Richard SchmalenseeMassachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Marius SchwartzGeorgetown University David S. SibleyUniversity of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics Vernon L. SmithChapman University - Economic Science Institute; Chapman University School of Law Edward A. SnyderUniversity of Chicago - Booth School of Business A. Michael SpenceStanford Graduate School of Business Pablo T. SpillerUniversity of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group Alan O. SykesNew York University School of Law; Stanford University - Law School David TeeceUniversity of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group Michael D. WhinstonNorthwestern University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) April 6, 2006 Abstract: The "parallel behavior is enough" standard cannot assist the courts in distinguishing horizontal agreements to restrain trade from normal competition. It would very likely impose significant costs on the economy by distorting competitive incentives and encouraging meritless litigation designed mainly to induce financial settlements.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 30 Keywords: Twombly, Bell Atlantic, Bell Atlantic v Twombly, Amici Curiae, Sherman Section 1 JEL Classification: K21, L41, L42 working papers seriesDate posted: January 21, 2009Suggested CitationContact Information
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
FAQ
Terms of Use
Privacy Policy
Copyright
This page was processed by apollo4 in 0.922 seconds