Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1330601
 
 

References (46)



 
 

Citations (3)



 


 



Trade Protection and Bureaucratic Corruption: An Empirical Investigation


Pushan Dutt


INSEAD - Economics and Political Sciences


Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 42, Issue 1, pp. 155-183, February 2009

Abstract:     
We examine whether protectionist trade policies lead to increased bureaucratic corruption. Using multiple measures of corruption and trade policies, we find strong evidence that corruption is significantly higher in countries with protectionist trade policies. These results are robust to endogeneity concerns. Next, a panel-data-based GMM methodology is used to estimate a dynamic model of corruption. This estimator controls for country-specific effects, potential endogeneity of trade policy, and existence of measurement errors afflicting the corruption data. The paper strengthens the case for trade liberalization and argues that trade reforms may lead to improvements in governance.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 29

JEL Classification: F13, D73

Accepted Paper Series





Date posted: January 20, 2009  

Suggested Citation

Dutt, Pushan, Trade Protection and Bureaucratic Corruption: An Empirical Investigation. Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 42, Issue 1, pp. 155-183, February 2009. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1330601 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5982.2008.01503.x

Contact Information

Pushan Dutt (Contact Author)
INSEAD - Economics and Political Sciences ( email )
1 Ayer Rajah Avenue
Singapore, 138676
Singapore
65-6799-5498 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://faculty.insead.edu/dutt/
Feedback to SSRN


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References:  46
Citations:  3

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