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Partial Compliance with Economic Sanctions


Hamid Beladi


University of Texas at San Antonio - College of Business - Department of Economics

Reza Oladi


Utah State University - College of Business - Department of Economics

Review of Development Economics, Vol. 13, Issue 1, pp. 125-133, February 2009

Abstract:     
By bridging the gap between the strategic model of sanctions and the public choice framework of sanctions, the authors introduce a new sanctions game. Contrary to an earlier finding, they show that the partial compliance of the target country, along with mild sanctions, are not only an equilibrium outcome, but also Pareto superior to non-compliance and tough economic sanctions.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 9

Accepted Paper Series


Date posted: January 20, 2009  

Suggested Citation

Beladi, Hamid and Oladi, Reza, Partial Compliance with Economic Sanctions. Review of Development Economics, Vol. 13, Issue 1, pp. 125-133, February 2009. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1330651 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9361.2008.00454.x

Contact Information

Hamid Beladi (Contact Author)
University of Texas at San Antonio - College of Business - Department of Economics ( email )
6900 North Loop 1604 West
P.O. Box 5636
San Antonio, TX 78249
United States
210-458-7038 (Phone)
210-458-7040 (Fax)
Reza Oladi
Utah State University - College of Business - Department of Economics ( email )
3530 Old Main Hill
Logan, UT 84322-3530
United States
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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References:  10

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