Electoral Control when Policies are for Sale
University of Lille I - Department of Economics and Management; Lille Economie & Management (LEM) UMR 9221
University of New Caledonia
CESifo Working Paper Series No. 2522
This article analyses the dynamics of electoral promises, building on an electoral competition model with endogenous policies. It extends the Grossman-Helpman (1994) model (Grossman G., Helpman E. (1994), "Protection for sale", American Economic Review, 84, 4, 833-850) to include sanctions from the electorate and lobbies when the incumbent does not satisfy the expected performance she promised to deliver. This framework allows to deal with the intertemporal dimension needed to understand the prevalent cycle of promises, disappointment, new promises, new disappointment.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 27
Keywords: lobbies, promises, elections, electoral competition, lies
JEL Classification: D72, P16
Date posted: January 21, 2009
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