Abstract

  
 

References (48)



 


 



Electoral Control when Policies are for Sale


Etienne Farvaque


University of Lille I - Department of Economics and Management

Gael Lagadec


University of New Caledonia
January 2009

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 2522

Abstract:     
This article analyses the dynamics of electoral promises, building on an electoral competition model with endogenous policies. It extends the Grossman-Helpman (1994) model (Grossman G., Helpman E. (1994), "Protection for sale", American Economic Review, 84, 4, 833-850) to include sanctions from the electorate and lobbies when the incumbent does not satisfy the expected performance she promised to deliver. This framework allows to deal with the intertemporal dimension needed to understand the prevalent cycle of promises, disappointment, new promises, new disappointment.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 27

Keywords: lobbies, promises, elections, electoral competition, lies

JEL Classification: D72, P16

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: January 21, 2009  

Suggested Citation

Farvaque, Etienne and Lagadec, Gael, Electoral Control when Policies are for Sale (January 2009). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 2522. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1330811

Contact Information

Etienne Farvaque
University of Lille I - Department of Economics and Management ( email )
Villeneuve D'Ascq Cedex, 59655
France
Gael Lagadec (Contact Author)
University of New Caledonia ( email )
Department of Economics
BPR4 - 98851 Nouméa Cedex
New Caledonia
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 233
Downloads: 47
References:  48

© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright
This page was processed by apollo1 in 0.515 seconds