A Property Economics Explanation of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis
University of Bremen
Berlin School of Economics
This paper investigates some of the underlying drivers of the 2008 global financial crisis. It is argued that a functioning system requires sufficient property in form of bank capital to absorb losses (banks and central banks), collateral to secure loans (enterprises) and adequate levels of interest rates to compensate for the burdening of property in this process. Thus interest rates set too low cause severe imbalances and the availability of unimpaired property assets determines the creation of money and credit. Two key principles of central banking were breached before and during the crisis. Firstly, very low interest rates by the two largest central banks triggered the crisis by helping to create the subprime asset bubble. Secondly, the recent lowering of collateral standards and balance sheet expansion by the Federal Reserve are possibly ineffective and expensive central bank policy responses. It is shown that the underlying issue of the crisis - the solvency of banks - cannot be addressed by a central bank but requires the state acting as a "proprietor of last resort" who directly recapitalizes banks. It is suggested that significant government intervention in bank lending may be required to stop the crisis from further deteriorating.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 14
Keywords: Financial crisis, subprime crisis, mortgage, money, monetary policy, property economics, central banking, nature of money, youth bulge, property
JEL Classification: E50, E58, N100, G21, G24, J11working papers series
Date posted: January 23, 2009
© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo6 in 0.626 seconds