Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1333626
 
 

References (101)



 
 

Citations (2)



 


 



Endogenous Preferences: The Political Consequences of Economic Institutions


Jan‐Emmanuel De Neve


University College London; London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE)

March 16, 2013

LSE Political Science and Political Economy Working Paper No. 04/2009

Abstract:     
This paper studies the broad left-right voting patterns across Western democracies since 1960. Using a novel data set for the median voter, the paper finds that voting behaviour is closely related to the presence of specific political-economic institutions. Labour organization, skill specificity, and public sector employment are associated with left-right voting behaviour and the presence of institutional complementarities may thus influence electoral outcomes. This research therefore suggests that coordinated and liberal market economies generate economic incentives that help sustain the broadly observed left-right voting patterns. Statistical analyses indicate that revealed voter preferences are endogenous to the variety of capitalism although reverse causality cannot be fully ruled out. This paper places political economy at the heart of voting behaviour and implies the existence of institutional advantages to partisan politics.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 35

Keywords: Political Economy, Median Voter, Voting Behavior, Panel Data, Instrumental Variables

JEL Classification: C23, D72, H5, J24, J51, O57, P51

working papers series





Download This Paper

Date posted: January 28, 2009 ; Last revised: March 18, 2013

Suggested Citation

De Neve, Jan‐Emmanuel, Endogenous Preferences: The Political Consequences of Economic Institutions (March 16, 2013). LSE Political Science and Political Economy Working Paper No. 04/2009. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1333626 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1333626

Contact Information

Jan-Emmanuel De Neve (Contact Author)
University College London ( email )
29/30 Tavistock Square
London, WC1H 9QU
United Kingdom
London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) ( email )
Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
HOME PAGE: http://personal.lse.ac.uk/deneve/
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 1,179
Downloads: 293
Download Rank: 59,616
References:  101
Citations:  2

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo7 in 0.328 seconds