Democracy, Sovereignty and Tax Competition: The Role of Tax Sovereignty in Shaping Tax Cooperation
Diane M. Ring
Boston College - Law School
January 28, 2009
Florida Tax Review, Vol. 9, p. 555, 2009
Boston College Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 171
This paper considers the question of how sovereignty shapes arguments over the merits of tax competition and how sovereignty influences the design of responses to tax competition. Part I provides a basic overview of sovereignty concepts, in particular their relevance to a nation-state desirous of control over tax policy. Part II defines tax competition, identifies the different kinds of states involved, reviews the emergence of the OECD project to limit harmful tax competition, and traces the EU experience with tax competition. Part III explores the normative grounds for challenging tax competition and the role of sovereignty in shaping and limiting these challenges. Finally, Part IV, working from the practical and theoretical baselines established in Part III, considers how an appreciation of sovereignty claims can facilitate the design of plausible cooperation strategies for states trying to limit tax competition.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 42
Keywords: tax competition, tax rules, taxation, tax policyAccepted Paper Series
Date posted: January 29, 2009 ; Last revised: July 15, 2010
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