Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1334882
 
 

References (78)



 
 

Citations (10)



 


 



Is There a Market for Ideas?


Joshua S. Gans


University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management; NBER

Scott Stern


Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

December 3, 2009


Abstract:     
This paper draws on recent work in market design to evaluate the conditions under which a market for ideas or technology (MfTs) will emerge and operate efficiently. As highlighted by Roth (2007), effective market design must ensure three basic principles: market thickness, lack of congestion, and market safety. Roth also highlight the importance of dealing with “repugnance.” Our analysis identifies the factors that are, in most circumstances, likely to inhibit the allocative efficiency of MfT. We show that key institutional developments such as the development of formalized IP exchanges suggest that effective market design may be possible for some innovation markets. Finally, our analysis suggests that markets for ideas are beset by the “repugnance” problem: from the perspective of market design, Open Science is an institution that places normative value on “free” disclosure and so undermines the ability of ideas producers to earn market-based returns for producing even very valuable “pure” knowledge.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 35

Keywords: ideas market, intellectual property, market design, repugnance, appropriation

JEL Classification: O31

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: January 29, 2009 ; Last revised: December 7, 2009

Suggested Citation

Gans, Joshua S. and Stern, Scott, Is There a Market for Ideas? (December 3, 2009). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1334882 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1334882

Contact Information

Joshua S. Gans (Contact Author)
University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management ( email )
Canada
HOME PAGE: http://www.joshuagans.com

NBER ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Scott Stern
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management ( email )
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
617-253-3053 (Phone)
617-253-2660 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 3,194
Downloads: 762
Download Rank: 16,847
References:  78
Citations:  10
Paper comments
No comments have been made on this paper

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo6 in 0.296 seconds