Abstract

 


 



Legal Doubletalk and the Concern with Positional Conflicts: A 'Foolish Consistency'?


Helen A. Anderson


University of Washington - School of Law

2006

Penn State Law Review, Vol. 111, No. 1, 2006

Abstract:     
This article explores the question whether lawyers should be able to argue both sides of a legal issue is unrelated cases. Today the ABA and many state bar associations caution against so-called "positional conflicts," analyzing them as potential conflicts of interest under a multi-factor test. This relatively recent concern misses the real potential for harm: it is precisely when a lawyer decides not to make a contradictory argument for one client in order not to offend or harm another client that an ethical problem is likely to be present. A positional conflict is therefore evidence that any pressure to modify arguments has been overcome. In fact, a rule against positional conflicts only increases lawyers' incentives to modify or drop arguments for the less-favored client. Thus, there should be no ethical prohibition against positional conflicts. On the other hand, a positional conflict may create credibility problems, despite the widely held professional ideals of independence and detachment. The positional conflict debate exposes fundamental ambivalence about lawyer sincerity, loyalty and independence. Eliminating a rule against positional conflicts will to some extent mitigate those credibility problems, but not entirely.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 53

Keywords: Ethics, Positional conflicts, Conflict of interest

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Date posted: February 5, 2009 ; Last revised: October 12, 2011

Suggested Citation

Anderson, Helen A., Legal Doubletalk and the Concern with Positional Conflicts: A 'Foolish Consistency'? (2006). Penn State Law Review, Vol. 111, No. 1, 2006. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1337677

Contact Information

Helen A. Anderson (Contact Author)
University of Washington - School of Law ( email )
William H. Gates Hall
Box 353020
Seattle, WA 98105-3020
United States

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