Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1337937
 
 

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Democracy, Populism, and (Un)bounded Rationality


Johannes Binswanger


Tilburg University - Netspar and CentER

Jens Prufer


Tilburg University - CentER; Tilburg University - Law and Economics Center (TILEC); Tilburg University - Department of Organization & Strategy

April 29, 2009

CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2009-10

Abstract:     
In many instances, both voters and politicians are imperfectly informed about which policies are optimal. We analyze politicians’ policy choice in such situations. A distinctive element of our analysis is that we investigate how the strategic sophistication of voters’ beliefs about politicians’ behavior affects policy choice. This provides a novel approach in political economy that leads to a number of important insights. We show that these beliefs determine the strength of self-serving politicians’ incentives to engage in populism. Surprisingly, limited strategic sophistication of voters weakens politicians’ incentives to pander to public opinion. The reason is that politicians know that such voters expect them to choose a policy that is not perfectly pandering to public opinion. Furthermore, when comparing the welfare ranking of different constitutional regimes, we find that limited strategic sophistication of voters makes indirect democracy relatively more attractive compared to the case of full strategic rationality – and often more attractive than alternative constitutional regimes.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 37

Keywords: Imperfect information, beliefs, strategic sophistication, democracy, populism, accountability, experts

JEL Classification: D72, D78, D83

working papers series


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Date posted: February 5, 2009 ; Last revised: May 2, 2009

Suggested Citation

Binswanger, Johannes and Prufer, Jens, Democracy, Populism, and (Un)bounded Rationality (April 29, 2009). CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2009-10. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1337937 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1337937

Contact Information

Johannes Binswanger (Contact Author)
Tilburg University - Netspar and CentER ( email )
P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, DC 5000 LE
Netherlands
HOME PAGE: http://center.uvt.nl/staff/binswanger/
Jens Prufer
Tilburg University - CentER ( email )
P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, DC 5000 LE
Netherlands
Tilburg University - Law and Economics Center (TILEC) ( email )
Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
Tilburg University - Department of Organization & Strategy ( email )
Netherlands
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