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http://ssrn.com/abstract=1338927
 
 

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Gun Control after Heller: Threats and Sideshows from a Social Welfare Perspective


Philip J. Cook


Duke University - Sanford School of Public Policy; Duke University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Jens Ludwig


Georgetown University - Public Policy Institute (GPPI); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Adam M. Samaha


New York University School of Law

February 6, 2009

U of Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 454
U of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 259

Abstract:     
What will happen after Heller? We know that the Supreme Court will no longer tolerate comprehensive federal prohibitions on home handgun possession by some class of trustworthy homeowners for the purpose of, and perhaps only at the time of, self-defense. But the judiciary could push further, if nothing else by incorporating Heller's holding into the Fourteenth Amendment and enforcing it against states and municipalities. In fact, the majority opinion offered little guidance for future cases. It presented neither a purely originalist method of constitutional interpretation nor a constraining doctrinal framework for evaluating other regulation - even while it gratuitously suggested that much existing gun control is acceptable. In the absence of more information from the Court, we identify plausible legal arguments for the next few rounds of litigation and assess the stakes for social welfare.

We conclude that some of the most salient legal arguments after Heller have little or no likely consequence for social welfare based on available data. For example, the looming fight over local handgun bans - an issue on which we present original empirical data - seems largely inconsequential. The same can be said for a right to carry a firearm in public with a permit. On the other hand, less prominent legal arguments could be quite threatening. Taxation and regulation targeted especially at firearms might be presumptively disfavored by judges in the future, along the lines of free speech doctrine. This could have serious consequences. In addition, Second Amendment doctrine might generally dampen enthusiasm for innovative regulatory responses to the problem of gun violence. The threat of litigation may inhibit policy experimentation ranging from micro-stamping on shell casings, to pre-market review of gun design, to so-called personalized firearms, and beyond.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 56

Keywords: gun control, second amendment, gun rights, Heller, social welfare

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Date posted: February 7, 2009  

Suggested Citation

Cook, Philip J. and Ludwig, Jens and Samaha, Adam M., Gun Control after Heller: Threats and Sideshows from a Social Welfare Perspective (February 6, 2009). U of Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 454; U of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 259. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1338927 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1338927

Contact Information

Philip J. Cook
Duke University - Sanford School of Public Policy ( email )
201 Science Drive
Box 90312
Durham, NC 27708-0239
United States
919-613-7360 (Phone)
919-681-8288 (Fax)
Duke University - Department of Economics
213 Social Sciences Building
Box 90097
Durham, NC 27708-0204
United States
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Jens Ludwig
Georgetown University - Public Policy Institute (GPPI) ( email )
3600 N Street, NW Suite 200
Washington, DC 20057
United States
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany
Adam M. Samaha (Contact Author)
New York University School of Law ( email )
40 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States
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